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Abstract
Theory predicts that coalition governments spend more than majorities. Focus-
ing on Portuguese municipal governments over the period between 1993 and 2012,
we empirically investigate whether majorities invest less than coalition governments.
Using a two step methodology which consists of exploring discontinuities in govern-
ment type and comparing municipalities which changed their type of government
around the discontinuity with those that did not, we are able to isolate a causal
effect. Contrary to the theoretical predictions, we find that mayors that are able
to hold a majority in the City Hall Council significantly increase their investment
relative to those who are not. This result is in line with others in the empirical
literature, such as Freier and Odendahl (2012) and Garmann (2014).
∗I deeply thank Professor Susana Peralta for all the attentive guidance, enriching ideas, criticism and
valuable mentorship. To my father and my mother.




Democratic countries are most frequently governed by coalition governments than majori-
ties. Seldom is being the most voted party equivalent to earning the majority of seats in
the parliament, and to negotiate with other parties in order to establish a parliamentary
majority is a necessary step towards government formation. Coalition governments bring
the benefit of being more inclusive, as a larger number of different interest groups in the
population is represented in the executive and policy-making is more easily moderated.
However, a larger degree of heterogeneity in preferences of represented political forces and
the polarisation of votes can make the process of forming a coalition extremely costly. The
recent experiences of Spain and Holland are illustrative, and coalition negotiations in Ger-
many have also recently started to complicate. Similarly, coalition executives might be
faced with more burdensome negotiation processes which can delay and restrain policy
adoption.
The relationship between governments and fiscal policy has been object of interest of
vast theoretical and empirical research. The strategic use of fiscal policy tools to maximize
re-election perspectives as well as its heterogenous use related to ideological differences
have been the main points of focus. However, governments often need to negotiate with
coalition partners to conduct policy. We acknowledge the relevant differences between
coalitions agreed pre-elecorally, post-electorally and governments ruling under minority
(Edin and Ohlsson, 1991) but our interest lies in whether a government has discretionary
power or needs to undertake negotiation, and the term “coalition” should henceforth be
understood as any form of government including more than a single party. The purpose of
this work project is to investigate whether majoritararian governments change their fiscal
behaviour when compared to coalitions. Particularly, does a majority status enhance or
restrain spending?
The bulk of the literature stems from the theoretical models put forward by Weingast et
al (1981) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007). While the former presents a common
pool problem with asymetric perception of projects’ costs and benefits which induce over
implementation and the latter highlights a vote seeking spending enhancing competition
within the coalition, both lead to the general result that coalitions are expected to spend
more. Empirical evidence, however, presents conflicting results and, crucially, often fails
to properly address endogeneity issues in government type assignment.
The institutional homogeneity and data availability make portuguese municipalities
an ideal setting to explore the question of whether coalitions spend more than absolute
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majorities, despite the dominance of majoritarian governments. We focus on investment
expenditures as these are less rigid than current expenditures and more often manipulated
by governments (Veiga and Veiga, 2007a).
In order to explore exogenous variation in the majority status we develop a two-step
methodology that explores discontinuities in the government type. City Hall Councils
(Câmaras Municpais) are composed of an odd number of seats, and members are elected
proportionally and allocated according to the D’Hondt method. Therefore, the ability
to form a majority government changes discontinuously if the mayor’s party is able to
earn the last seat that allows him to control the majority of seats or not. I define the
threshold as half of the total number of seats in the council and define municipalities
“located around the threshold” to be those in which the most voted party has exactly
the number of seats that guarantees majority (just majority) or one fewer seat than that
(just coalition).
We analyse close elections by restricting the sample to just majorities and just coali-
tions and proceed by analysing transitions in the government type: comparing munic-
ipalities which changed their government type around the disontinuity threshold with
municipalities that did not. Furthermore, we do so for municipalities with similar enough
electoral outcomes so that observed differences can be attributed to the change in type
of government and differences in government type attributed to randomness in voting
behaviour.
Our findings show that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, majority governments
spend more than coalitions. The result seems to be driven by increases of municipalities
that become majorities and not by decreases in municipalities that become coalitions
and political capital built by larger vote shares further enhances the effect. Preliminary
analysis of an alternative methodology, a fuzzy regression discontinuity, confirms the
direction of our results.
The remainder of this work project is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the
literature on the topic, Section 3 presents the institutional landscape and describes the
data, while Section 4 discusses the methodology employed. Section 5 lays the preliminary
facts, Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Section 7 briefly explores an alternative
methodology and Section 8 concludes.
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2 Literature Review
This work project intends to study the impact of the type of government (majority or
coalition) on fiscal policy, namely investment. The topic has been object of considerable
theoretical and empirical analysis, which we review in this section.
The seminal work of Weingast et al (1981) develops a common pool problem in which
a higher number of decision-makers with different preferences induces over-spending and
higher deficits. Persson, Roland and Tabelini (2007) also theoretically predict coalitions
to spend more, identifying the difficulty of voters to attribute individual responsibility for
decisions as a driver for an expenditure intensifying competition among the members of
the coalition, while highlighting the endogenous role of the electoral rule.1
While both theoretical models predict that coalitions are expected to spend more
than majoritarian governments, empirical evidence on the topic is mixed, as some studies
argue the size of cabinet to be more important than coalition status or size (Perotti and
Kontopoulos, 2002; Schaltegger and Feld, 2009) or that coalition governments do not
affect expenditures (Baskaran, 2013).
Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) confirmed the prediction that coalition governments are
related to higher fiscal deficits, using data on OECD countries. Exploring different groups
of countires, and despite some conflicting results, other cross-country studies have gener-
ally found positive impact of coalition governments (Persson et al, 2007) and government
fragmentation (Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; Bawn and Rosenbluth, 2006), defined as
the number of different parties in a coalition, on the deficit, expenditures and transfers.2
One relevant drawback of cross-country studies is the high degree of institutional
heterogeneity which they need to address (Baskaran, 2013). In order to resolve the issue,
some studies have focused on sub-national levels of government. Asworth and Heyndels
(2005) study Flemish municipalities to find that coalition and cabinet size both drive
spending increases. Borge (2005), investigating Norwegian local governments, finds that
single-party majorities induce deficit reductions and Le Maux et al (2011) also find a
positive link between the number of parties in a coalition and expenditures in the context
of french départements.3 Shcaltegger and Feld (2009) focus on Swiss cantons to argue that
1In a coalition government, voters are not able to perfectly monitor which member is responsible for
which decision. Politicians are election-oriented and voters reward or punish them at the polls. Persson,
Roland and Tabelini (2007) show that the plurality rule favours majority formation and proportional rule
favours coalition formation, relatively.
2Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) explore a panel of 19 OECD countries, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)
focus on 17 European countries and Persson et al (2007) study 50 parliamentary democracies.
3Départements are a sub-national divisiosn of territory in France.
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coalitions may not matter for fiscal outcomes, pointing cabinet size as the main driver.
Importantly, it remains unsettled whether many of the previous studies have properly
accounted for endogeneity issues (Garmann, 2014). Persson et al (2007) rely on IV es-
timation using the electoral rule as an instrument for the government type.4 Garmann
(2014) employs a Regression Kink Design (RKD) methodology in a panel of German mu-
nicipalities, exploring the discontinuity in the probability to form a majority government
around the 50% vote share threshold to isolate the causal effect of coalition governments
on fiscal outcomes, finding majorities to spend more than coalition governments.5 In line
with these results, Artés and Jurado (2014) and Freier and Odendahl (2012) use regression
discontinuity strategies to find, respectively, that in the context of Spanish municipali-
ties majorities run higher deficits and in the context of German municipalities majorities
increase spending and property tax rates.
Portuguese mayors have been found to strategically manipulate the timing and com-
position of public expenditure. Particularly, municipal governments significantly increase
investment expenditures in pre-elecoral and electoral periods, and more so in items that
are highly perceivable by the electorate, such as roads. Furthermore, the magnitude of
the manipulation does not seem to depend on the composition of the Municipal Assem-
bly (Veiga and Veiga, 2007a). These findings largely support the existence of political
business cycles (see Nordhaus, 1975 and Rogoff, 1990) which have been shown to yield
enhanced electoral results for incumbent mayors running for re-election (Veiga and Veiga,
2007b).
Heterogeneous fiscal behaviours can also be linked to the ideological and partisan
differences in political control of local governments (Petterson-Lidbom, 2008, Ferreira
and Gyourko, 2009). In the portuguese local context, left-wing governments favour the
adoption of municipal corporate taxes and exhibit a predilection for social infrastructure
investment whereas right-wing mayors tend to increase compensation of municipal workers
and family subsidies (Migueis, 2012). Left-wing mayors exhibit a higher level of oppor-
tunistic behaviour (Veiga and Veiga, 2007a) and alignment with the central government
increases transfers received by municipalities (Migueis, 2013).
4Since the type of government is not exogenous to the electoral rule, the latter has an effect on spending
that works via the government type and constitutes a valid instrument
5A possible strategy would be to follow Garmann (2014)’s approach and develop a Regression Kink
Design around the 50% vote share threshold. However, the small number of seats in Portuguese local
governments and the particularities of the D’Hondt method make it more likely that less populous mu-
nicipalities have majorities. This makes it difficult to verify balancedness in municipalities’ observables
around the threshold. For this reason, we rely on an alternative methodology and provide preliminary
evidence on the Regression Kink Strategy in Section 7. Balance tests on pre-treatment observables are
availabe in the Appendix.
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This work project adds to the existing literature concerning portuguese local govern-
ments, their use of fiscal policy instruments – namely spending – and ability to strate-
gically manipulate them. It represents however, to the best of my knowledge, the first
attempt to study the causal impact of majority governments on public investment in the
context of portuguese municipalities thus contributing to the enrichment of the knowledge
in the field.
3 Institutional Setting and Data Description
This study focuses on municipalities, the second level of decentralized government in
Portugal, to assess the impact of majoritarian governments on fiscal policy. Each munic-
ipality is further divided into parishes (freguesias), the lower level of administration in
Portugal. The average mainland municipality has 35890 inhabitants and an area of 32020
hectares.6 For statistical stastistical purposes, municipalities are further grouped into 25
sub-national divisions called NUTS3.7 Although there is a total of 308 municipalities in
Portugal, due to relevant differences between the governance of the autonomous regions of
Azores and Madeira and the remaining of the country, we focus on the 278 municipalities
located in the mainland, which we analyse over the 1993-2012 period. The period includes
5 electoral terms of 4 years each. 8
The decentralization of powers in Portugal aims at fostering the efficiency in supply
of local public goods and promoting regional development, according to the principle
of subsidiarity. Municipal governments have jurisdiction over planning, administration
and investment in a wide range of services such as energy and water supply, education
or health.9 Furthermore, they have autonomy, within centrally defined intervals, to set
different tax rates: a municipal contribution in the IRS (personal income tax), which is
a share of personal income tax the municipal government can return to the taxpayer, a
property tax (IMI) levied on real estate value and a tax on corporate profits (Derrama)
as well as miscelaneous fees related to the private use of public services or spaces.10
Municipalities receive conditional and unconditional transfers from the central gov-
ernment and the European Community, distributed by different social funds according
to multiple demographic and socioeconomic criteria or depending on project approval.
6Population data refers to the last year in our dataset, 2012. Source: Statistics Portugal and POR-
DATA.
7There are 23 NUTS3 in the mainland and Azores and Madeira constitute one NUTS3 each.
8The last electoral term considered is 2010-2013. However, for data availability reasons, the last year
is not considered.
9Law n 159/99 of September 14th
10IRS - Imposto sobre o Rendimento de Pessoas Singulares. IMI - Imposto Municipal sobre Imóveis.
6
Figure 1: Investment per capita Distribution
Source: DGAL. Investment Expenditures for all
mainland municipalities between 1993 and 2012.
Own funds include tax revenues, the collection of fines and fees and the proceeds from
the municipalities’ activities (sale of property, rents and concessions). 11
Local governments have considerable freedom in their spending decisions. In this
study, we analyse investment expenditures as they are more volatile and more easily ma-
nipulated by the executive than current expenditures, since the latter include salaries as
well as other more rigid expenditures related to the the municipalities operations (Veiga
and Veiga, 2007a). Investment expenditures are divided into land, housing and other
buildings, transportation material, machinery equipment, other investments and miscel-
laneous construction including sewage, water distribution and roads and streets construc-
tion among others. Fiscal data are made available to the public by the General Directorate
for Local Authorities(DGAL).12
Figure 1 shows the distribution of per capita investment, revealing considerable right
skewness. Wooldridge (2000) suggests that taking natural logs of strictly positive depen-
dent variables can solve problems of skewness and heteroskedasticity. In our sample, per
capita investment is striclty positive. As such, we consider its natural log in our analysis.
The municipal government is composed of a legislative branch, the Municipal As-
sembly (Assembleia Municipal), and an executive one, the City Hall Council (Câmara
Municipal), independently elected every four years. Parties, pre-electoral coalitions and
independent groups of citizens can compete in local elections. In addition, a Parish As-
sembly (Assembleia de Freguesia) is also elected and the elected president of each parish
also holds seat in the Municipal Assembly, which is formed by these and by the directly
elected members.
11Law No 73/2013, of September 3rd (current version).
12Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais; http://www.portalautarquico.pt
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Table 1: Absolute Majorities
1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 2006-2009 2010-2012
Nr 207 247 244 252 252
% 75,3% 89,8% 87,8% 90,6% 90,6%
Source: Author’s using data from CNE.
The City Hall Council is elected proportionally, with votes converted into seats through
the D’Hondt method. The mayor is the head of the most voted electoral list and the
Council further includes 4 to 16 alderman, depending on the municipal population. The
D’Hondt method favours larger parties’ representation, increasing the likelihood of ma-
jority formation (see Section 4). Accordingly, portuguese local political landscape has
been dominated by majorities in City Hall Councils. Table 1 summarizes the relative
presence of majorities in portuguese municipalities over the analysed period. Throughout
the years, between 75% and 91% of municipalities were ruled by majoritary governments.
The local governance of portuguese municipalities has been historically dominated by
the center-left PS (Partido Socialista) and the center-right PSD (Partido Social Democrata),
the two parties with larger representation in national parliament, although a relevant share
of municipalities has been under the government of the left-wing party PCP (Partido Co-
munista Português). Seldom did the left wing BE (Bloco de Esquerda), the right-wing
CDS-PP (Centro Democrático Social - Partido Popular), other smaller parties or inde-
pendent groups of citizens earn the majority of seats in the City Hall Council. Henceforth,
Right-Wing (RW) parties refers to PSD and CDS-PP while Left-Wing (LW) parties refers
to PS, BE and PCP.13
The mayor and the City Hall Council it leads are responsible for designing policies and
budgets and, following the literature (Veiga and Veiga ,2007a, Lopes da Fonseca, 2016),
will be gennerally looked at as the relevant decision-making level of government. In order
to address the fact that there are several possible combinations of majority and non-
majority in the Council and the Municipal Assembly and that policy adoption depends
on Assembly approval, we depart from Lopes and Peralta (2016) municipal adaptation of
Tavares (2014) Ideological Complexion of Government and Parliament, the Ideological Com-
plexion of Municipal Executive and Council Index (ICMEC) to build a control for this factor
in our study - which we call index. The ICMEC’s purpose is to capture the ideological
composition of government in both bodies, and ranges from 1 to 5 in the following way:
If RW parties hold majority of both Council and Assembly the ICMEC takes the value
13Smaller parties and independent groups of citizens are considered neither.
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1. If RW holds majority of either body it takes value 2. Value 3 means no majorities are
held. The ICMEC assumes value 4 if LW mayor has majority in Council or Assembly and
5 if holds majority in both bodies.
Accordingly, our binary variable index takes value 1 when the ICMEC takes values 1
or 5, capturing municipalities where there is an ideological majority in both bodies.
Political and electoral data, including contestants, vote shares and seats earned are
published by the National Electoral Comission (CNE), the entity responsible for regulating
the electoral process.14 As elections take place towards the end of the year, elected
governments are assumed to be responsible for fiscal outcomes starting the year after the
election took place.15
Other demographic and geographic data are used as additional controls and chosen in
light of the literature review. Total consumption of energy is included to control for the
municipalities’ socioeconomic activity. Control data are taken from miscellaneous sources
such as Statistics Portugal (INE), PORDATA and General Directorate for Energy and
Geology (DGEG).16 Table 2 summarizes the variables included. Marktest Sales Index
compiles the information from the above sources and was used as a complementary tool
for data collection.
Our analysis relies on a procedure which involves restricting the sample to those mu-
nicipalities where the mayor holds just enough seats to have majority in the City Hall –
which we call “Just Majority” – and those municipalities where the mayor’s party earned
exactly one seat less than that – which we call “Just Coalition” (see Section 4). Table 2
also presents the summary statistics for the restricted sample.
4 Methodology
The causal effect of the type of government on public investment could be basically
described by the following relation:
Yit = α + β1Mit + δ
′X + γt + γNUTS3 + εit, (1)
where Yit is the natural logarithm of per capita investment of municipality i in period
t, Mit a dummy variable indicating an absolute majority government and X a vector of
demographic, geographic, political and socioeconomic controls. The terms γt and γNUTS3
14Comissão Nacional de Eleições (http://eleicoes.cne.pt/)
15Considered elections took place in 12/12/1993, 14/12/1997, 16/12/2001, 09/10/2005 and 11/10/2009.
16PORDATA – https://www.pordata.pt; Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia –
http://www.dgeg.gov.pt/;Instituto Nacional De Estat́ıstica – https://www.ine.pt.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Full Sample Restricted Sample
Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Ln(Investment per capita) 5.259 0.73 2.19 7.43 269 170.6 10.2 909.81
Total Population 35469.9 57119.9 1782 629361 31536.2 56241.1 1782 553646
Population Share 65+ 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.44 0.23 0.07 0.09 0.44
Area (10 000 ha) 3.202 2.835 0.0826 17.207 33.73 29.35 0.826 172.067
Coastal 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1
Left-Wing Government 0.5 0.49 0 1 0.54 0.49 0 1
Right-Wing Government 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.44 0.49 0 1
Alignment with Central Government 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Number of Seats in Council 6.72 1.45 5 17 6.58 1.70 5 17
ICMEC 3.16 1.89 1 5 3.26 1.83 1 5
index 0.87 0.34 0 1 0.82 0.38 0 1
Energy Consumption (1 000 000 kWh) 139.22 275.74 1.678 3468.48 137.65 280.40 2.23 3468.48
Observations 5536 2437
Sources: Investment per capita taken from DGAL. Total population, share of population above 65 and area taken from INE. Political Data
are taken from CNE. ICMEC from Lopes and Peralta (2016), index is author’s using data from ICMEC. Energy Consumption from DGEG.
Sources and links further detailed in Section 3. Full Sample includes all mainland municipalities from 1993 to 2012. Restricted Sample includes
all municipalities where the mayor’s party eared for two consecutive electoral periods just enough seats to have majority in the Council or
exactly one seat fewer than that.
represent year and NUTS3 fixed effects to control for aggregate time and geographical
shocks while εit is the error term.
One important issue is that the government type might be influenced by fiscal deci-
sions. Politicians value holding office and use the tools at their disposal in order to pursue
that objective. As stressed by Veiga and Veiga (2007a), portuguese mayors strategically
manipulate their expenditures in order to maximize their re-election perspectives. Fur-
thermore, parties have heterogeneous interests in controlling different municipalities, and
the multitude of relations between political forces affects both the election outcomes and
the fiscal choices once the governments are formed. Not all municipalities are equally
likely to be governed by a majority government and that fact by itself is probable to
influence investment choices. Specific characteristics of municipalities thus influence both
the fiscal outcome we intend to analyse and the form of government that vigours. These
mechanisms clearly point that issues of reverse causality and ommited variable bias are
likely to threaten the validity of a simple OLS regression of equation 1.
In order to explore how exogenous variations in government type affect municipal
investment, we use a two-step methodology: first, we explore close elections and rely
on the fact that there are known discontinuities in the type of government (majority vs
coalition) to restrict our analysis to municipalities “located” around the discontinuity
thresholds. Second, following the intuition of a double difference, we explore what we call
“transitions”.
The direct determinant of the resulting type of government are the votes each party
receives. As such, the vote share earned by the winning party could potentially constitute
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Figure 2: “The Kink” - Vote share of vs Frequency of Majority
Source: Author’s using data from CNE. Major-
ity takes value 1 if most voted party holds ma-
jority of seats in City Hall council. Dots repre-
sent within bin averages of majority status by vote
share. Lines are two quadratic fits with a discon-
tinuity at 50% voteshare
a source of government type discontinuities and variation. One feature of the D’Hondt
seat allocation method, especially when allocating over a reduced number of seats, is that
parties receiving as low as 40% of the vote total can earn the absolute majority of the
seats in the Council. All parties receiving at least 50% of the vote share guarantee a seat
majority, but below the 50% vote share the ability to form a majoritarian government
is increasing in the vote share. As Figure 2 clarifies that there is no sharp discontinuity
in treatment status around the 50% vote share threshold, so we focus on seats earned
instead.17 However, the observable kink in the probability of treatment (majority) at
the 50% threshold motivates a regression kink type of analysis in the spirit of Garmann
(2014), as discussed in Section 2. This possibility is explored preliminarily in Section 7.
The difference between becoming a majoritarian or a non-majoritarian government lies
exactly in whether or not the most voted party is able to earn the last seat that allows
it to control the majority of seats (The discontinuity threshold). As such, we restrict our
analysis to municipalities where the most voted party was able to earn the exact number
of seats needed to hold majority in the City Hall Council (“Just Majority”) or earned
exactly one fewer seat (“Just Coalition”), and refer to municipalities in these categories
as “located around the discontinuity threshold”.
As the majority status of governments around the discontinuity threshold is defined
by the allocation of one seat, our claim is that the number and combination of votes
determining allocation of this last seat can be attributed to randomness in voting be-
17“Sharp Discontinuity” is standard name in the literature for when the probability of treatment jumps
from 0 to 1 at the discontinuity.
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haviour. In fact, the same share of votes that can result in a just majority in a specific
municipality might result in a just coalition in another, depending on the number of seats
and the combination of votes among the remaining contestants.
For clarity, we introduce some notation. Let N be the number of seats available in
the City Hall Council of a given municipality, n be the number of seats earned by the
most voted party and int(x) represent the closest integer larger than x. Furthermore, let
M denote a just majority and C be an indicator for a just coalition, such that: Mt = 1, if n = int(N/2) in year tCt = 1, if n = int(N/2)− 1 in year t
We acknowledge that there might be relevant differences in coalitions agreed pre-
elecorally, post-electorally and governments ruling under minority (Edin and Ohlsson,
1991). Our interest, however, lies in whether a government has discretionary power or
needs to undertake negotiation, and so we explore no further distinction betweens coalition
types and call just coalition to any form of government where the mayor’s party holds
one seat fewer than she would need to hold majority (Garmann, 2014).
This strategy has a potential drawback due to the prevalence of pre-electoral coalitions
of the right wing parties PSD and CDS-PP that won elections, which makes it non-
negligible to include them in the just majorities if our interest truly lies in whether a
party needs to undertake negotiation or not. Throughout the period, 34 municipalities
were just majorities under the control of pre-electoral coalitions of PSD/CDS-PP. In order
to address this issue we generally consider these cases as just coalitions. We also present
the results for the main specification when we exclude these municipalities from the sample
(see Section 6). Table 2 also presents the summary statistics for the restricted sample.
After identifying municipalities around the discontinuity threshold, we explore what
we have named “transitions”. Particulary, we compare those municipalities that, in an
election, change from being just majorities to being just coalitions – which we name MC
– with municipalities that are just majorities and remain so after the election – MM .
We apply the same exercise to municipalities that were just coalitions and became just
majorities – CM – comparing them with municipalities that were just coalitions and so
remained – CC.
Formally, let t denote a year and t − 4 denote the period 4 years before t, capturing
the government type of the municipality in the previous electoral period. The sample is
restricted to municipalities located around the discontinuity threshold in both t and t−4,
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and modify equation 1 as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1Mit−4 + β2Mit + δ
′X + γt + γNUTS3 + εit, (2)
By comparing municipalities that changed their govenment type around the discontinuity
threshold with municipalities that did not, the differences, if existent, can be attributed
to the government type variation and a causal effect be derived.
In equation 2 our parameter of interest it β2. To understand why, consider first a
municipality MC, i.e., one that transitions from just majority to just coalition. The
total effect is given by β0 + β1. If we consider a municipality MM , the total effect is
β0 + β1 + β2. Comparing municipalities that depart from the same initial situation of
being just majorities, the effect of remaining a just majority as opposed to becoming a
just coalition is given by β2. If we replicate the exercise for municipalities that depart
from being just coalitions, we easily see that the effect of being a CC municipality is given
by β0 while that of being a CM municipality is β0 +β2. Again, the difference of becoming
a just majority compared to remaining a just coalition is given by β2.
Our methodology combines features of a regression discontinuity, in that we explore
the discontinuity in the type of government to restrict our sample, with features of a
Difference-in-Differences (DiD), in that we compare outcomes of municipalities which
changed their government type over an election with municipalities that did not. However,
there are relevant differences between our methodology of transition analysis and a DiD.
In our methodology, the treatment and control group are not constant through time and
comparisons are made over several elections, not a single event. Some municipalities
change their government type throughout the period and can be part of the treatment
group (one that transitions to a just majority) in one period and control (one that does
not) in another.
5 Preliminary Facts
The evolution of per capita investment (in natural logarithm) by government type can
be analysed in Figure 3. Majority governments seem to spend more than coalition gov-
ernments over the whole period. The fact that majorities spend constantly more through
time despite the group composition effect also points to larger spending by majorities.
In order to understand whether or not it is the majority status of a government that
impacts investment and not the vote share received by the winner party, Figure 4 plots
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Figure 3: Investment per capita by Government Type
Source: Author’s using data from DGAL. All
mainland municipalities included. Investment per
capita in natural log. Groups composition changes
in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2010.
both measures against the per capita investment (in natural log), showing linear fits below
and above the 50% threshold. While the investment seems to constinuously increase along
the vote share, we observe a clear discontinuity – increase – in the outcome around the
50% seat share threshold, where government type changes. Both facts futher support the
existence of a causal positive effect of absolute majorities on investment and validate the
exploration of the seat discontinuity.
Despite the observable discontinuity, there is a clear decreasing pattern to the left of the
50% seat threshold. The confidence intervals are larger towards both ends of the left-hand
side linear fit, suggesting that a reduced number of observations might be driving that
result. Furthermore, the decreasing pattern suggests that there might be a non-monotonic
effect of majoritarian governments on investment. The outcome driving mechanisms may
vary with different relations of political forces and the resulting outcome may be different
in coalitions where the most voted party has more or less relative importance within
the coalition. While the hypothesis is interesting, to explore it lies beyond the scope
of this study. Since our analysis and conclusions are local in that they are restricted to
municipalities around the discontinuity threshold, this fact poses no threat to our strategy.
5.1 Possible Confounding Factors
Some concerns must be addressed when restricting the sample as described in Section
4. One of those is that “transitions” may be geographically concentrated. If that is
the case, the results could be expressing local effects other than the type of goverment.
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Figure 4: Discontinuity Analysis
Vote Share of Winner Seat Share of Winner
Source: Author’s using Data from CNE and DGAL. Investment per capita in natural logarithm.
Grey shadows represent 95% confidence intervals of the linear fits. Left panel plots the per capita
investment (in natural log) against the vote share of the most voted party and the right panel against
the corresponding seat share
Figure 5 maps each of the transitions occured in the 2009 election, the most recent in
the sample, highlighting the municipalities that belong to the specified group.18 There
is no evidence of systematic geographical concentration in any transition and the maps
further emphasize the dominance of majoritary governments in portuguese municipalities.
In order to further control for local effects, all our regressions include NUTS3 fixed effects.
A second concern is that the majoritarian governments included in the restricted
sample are highly unbalanced vis-à-vis the political spectrum and that results are driven
by political ideology instead of government type. Table 3 exhibtits the number of M and
C governments, total and by ideology. There is a relatively higher presence of Left-Wing
majoritarian governments while just coalitions are balanced. However, a t-test for the
means shows that in our sample Left-Wing governments invest significantly less (around
3,6%) than the remaining. If the majoritarian government’s impact on investment is
confirmed to be positive, the ideological bias plays no role in that effect. Furthermore,
Right-Wing majorities increase their investment relative to non-majorities more than Left-
Wing majorities do. If anything, a positive impact would be understated. Nevertheless,
government’s ideology is controlled for in every regresion.
Table 4 shows the frequency of each type of transition, revealing that the number
of changes in the type of government is low relative to municipalities which mantain
their government type, which can potentially limit our ability to explore the government
variation effect. The dominance of majorities is again evident with the number of MM
being clearly dominant and with transitions from C to M outnumbering the opposite
18No spacial bias was identified in any of the elections, 2009 is representative and shown as an example.
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Figure 5: Geographic distribution of transitions - 2009 Elections
MC MM CM CC
Source: Author’s using data from CNE. Each map highlights the municipalities that made the respective
transition. Transitions: MC – From just majority to just coalition. MM – From just majority to just
majority. CM – From just coalition to just majority. CC – From just coalition to just coalition.
Table 3: M and C Governments
1998-2001 2002-2005 2005-2009 2010-2012 Total
M C M C M C M C M C
LW 88 14 61 20 76 10 72 15 297 59
RW 59 9 61 19 53 20 48 14 221 62
Total 148 23 122 40 131 32 120 31 521 126
Source: Author’s using data from CNE. M – just majority. C – just coalition.
16
Table 4: Transitions
MC MM CM CC
1998-2001 9 109 39 14
2002-2005 33 107 15 7
2006-2009 13 113 18 19
2010-2012 19 105 15 12
Total 74 434 87 52
Source: Author’s using data from CNE. M – just majority.
C – just coalition. CC, CM, MC and MM – transitions over
the conditions defined before.
variation.
The vast majority of municipalities stays a just majority through the elections and
only around 25% of the municipalities we follow make any transition. Furthermore, some
municipalities are only part of our sample for a limited period of time while others enter
and leave the sample more than once during the period, further limiting the exploration
of the time dimension. Since we are looking solely at those located around the disconti-
nuity threshold, municipalities where the winning party is able to earn more confortable
majorities or forms coalition governments where to win one more seat would still not
guarantee a majority leave our sample. By the same token, if they return in any future
election to the condition of just majority or just coalition transitioning from one of those
conditions in the previous electoral period, they appear in our sample again. The fact
that we are analysing a unbalanced panel where there is little within variation justifies
our decision not to employ individual fixed effects and pool our data instead.
The valid derivation of a causal effect from the analysis of transitions relies on the
assumption that municipalities that change government type are similar to municipalities
that mantain their government type. If they are not, in order to validate the claim that
the effect is driven by the government type variation we need to control for differences
in baseline covariates so that, conditional on those differences, the actual effect can be
assessed. Table 5 presents the means and mean differences for the baseline covariates
across compared groups.
6 Results
Table 6 presents the results of the main econometric approach expressed by equation 2.
Columns (1) and (2) present basic results excluding and including year and NUTS3 fixed
effects while column (3) exhibits our main equation, including the full set of controls.
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, parties that are able to earn the decisive seat
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Table 5: Balance Tests
Just Coalitions in previous election Just Majorities in previous election
CC CM Difference MC MM Difference
Total Population 73373.35 34998.61 38374.73*** 40790.70 24229.85 16560.83***
Population Share 65+ 0.194 0.219 -0.025*** 0.220 0.236 -0.015***
Area (10 000 ha) 2.65 3.64 -0.99*** 3.66 3.36 0.30
Coastal 0.33 0.29 0.04 0.25 0.16 0.09***
Left-Wing Government 0.46 0.53 -0.06 0.46 0.57 -0.11***
Right-Wing Government 0.50 0.47 0.03 0.50 0.42 0.08**
Alignment with Central Government 0.25 0.39 -0.14*** 0.44 0.45 -0.00
Energy Consumption 3.47 1.65 1.82*** 1.91 0.98 0.94***
Observations 196 333 277 1631
C – just coalition. M – just majority. CC, CM, MC and MM – transitions over the conditions defined before. Values are electoral term averages
for a municipality over an electoral term in which it qualifies as belonging to that transition. Left-Wing: Mayor belongs to PCP, BE or PS.
Right-Wing: Mayor belongs to PSD or CDS-PP. Indepent groups of citizens and smaller parties are considered neither. Significance levels: 1%***
5%** 10%*
Example: Municipality A has been a just majority over the 1994-1997 and over the 2002-2005 electoral terms and a just coalition over the 1998-2001
electoral term. The average value for covariate X for municipality A over the years 1998-2001 would be considered under MC and the average value
for covariate X in municipality A over the period 2002-2005 is considered under CM.
in the Council and become a just majority seem to increase the government’s investment
relative to those who are not. The result is statistically significant and economically rel-
evant. To be a just majority induces an investment increase of around 10% relative to
just coalitions, on average. Taking the mean municipality in our sample, this represents
around e 500000 (or e 30 per capita) per year. Coefficients on the treatment are posi-
tive and statistically significant across all specifications. The inclusion of demographic,
geographic, political and socioeconomic controls significantly increases the explanatory
power of the model and decreases the magnitude of the majority government effect.
A more aged population also increases municipal investment, as the need for better
accesses and overall infrastructures becomes of higher importance. A higher number of
alderman in the council is associated with lower levels of investment, pointing to the hy-
pothesis that a larger cabinet may induce more burdensome negotiation processes which
block investment levels. By the same token, just coalitions may also incur more in invest-
ment restraining negotiation processes and it may be part of the explanation for why just
majorities spend more.
Column (4) investigates whether the results are driven by the largest cities and ex-
cludes the top 1% most populous cities.19 The point estimate decreases but remains
statistically significant suggesting that largest cities might have an effect but are not the
main drivers of the effect.
The positive significant coefficients on column (4) together with the discussion in Sec-
tion 5 regarding ideological prevalence and negative coefficients on Left-Wing governments
show that results are not driven by large cities nor ideology but in fact by the government
type. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the index is not significant in any of the spec-
19Lisboa, Sintra, Vila Nova de Gaia e Porto.
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Table 6: Majority Government Effect: Regression Results
Ln(Investmentpc) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mt 0.268*** 0.197*** 0.102** 0.083* 0.091*
(0.073) (0.056) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054)
Demographic Controls - -
Pop Total -0.003** -0.002 0.011
Pop Share 65+ 2.81*** 2.44*** 2.79***
Geographic Controls - -
Area -0.005 -0.002 -0.005
Coastal -0.195** -0.189** -0.175**
Political Controls - -
Left Wing -0.070 -0.011 -0.195**
Alignment w/ Central Gov 0.045 0.049* 0.055*
Index 0.012 -0.016 -0.002
Nr of Seats in Council -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.107***
Socioeconomic Controls - -
Energy Consumption 0.044** 0.016 0.032*
Year FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS3 FE - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2407 2407 2407 2382 2282
R2 0.04 0.3636 0.4746 0.4599 0.4508
Notes: Standard Errors clustered at the municipality level reported in parentheses for the coefficient of interest. Ob-
servations above the 99th percentile of the dependent variable were dropped. 237 clusters in columns (1) to (3), 234 in
column (4) and 232 in (5). Column (4) excludes top 1% more populous municipalities. Column (5) excludes pre-elecotral
coalitions from the analysis. Significance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
ifications in which it is included, supporting our claim that the City Hall Council can be
validly regarded as the relevant level of local government.20
Column (5) shows the results when we exclude pre-electoral coalitions from our sample.
The coeficient loses significance as expected since excluding these observtions results in
less government type variation available for analysis. Nevertheless, estimates are positive,
economically and statistically significant, validating our results.
6.1 Robustness and Extensions
Figure 6 exhibits the distribution of vote shares in the restricted sample and makes it
evident that despite the previous exercise we can still be comparing municipalities where
the most voted party obtained slightly above 30% of the votes with municipalities in which
the most voted party earned around 70% of the votes.
In order to assess the robustness of our result, we further restrict the sample to those
municipalities in which the winning party received between 40% and 60% of the votes so
20index is the indicator for ideological majority in City Hall Council and Municipal Assembly, built
from the ICMEC (Lopes & Peralta, 2016). See section 3 for further detail.
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Figure 6: Vote Share of Winning Party Distribution
Table 7: Extensions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vote Share Bandwidth 40%-60% 42%-58% 45%-55% Full
Mt 0.129** 0.116* 0.113
(0.055) (0.062) (0.082)
Mt ∗ V oteShareit 0 0.798*
(0.475)
Mt -0.297
Observations 2194 2021 1553 2437
Clusters 234 232 213 237
Notes: All regressions include year and NUTS 3 fixed effects as well as the full set of demographic, ge-
ographic, political and socioeconomic controls. Standard Errors clustered at municipality level reported
in parentheses for the coefficient of interest. Observations above the 99th percentile of the dependent
variable were dropped. Significance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
that we can compare municipalities similar enough in terms of both electoral outcomes
– seats and votes. To reduce the vote share bandwidth futher supports the claim that
the just majority status can be attributed to random voting behaviour, as vote outcomes
between compared municipalities are also similar. Table 7 shows the results. Columns
(2) and (3) show the results of reducing the vote share bandwidth to 42%-58% and
45%-55%, respectively. Restricting the sample to closer elections increases the estimate
without harming statistical significance (column (1)), and confirms the result that to be a
just majority positively impacts investment. However, Columns (2) and (3) demonstrate
that as we reduce the bandwidth, the number of transitions we are able to analyise also
decreases and the econometric analysis eventually becomes non-significant.21
As Figure 2 demonstrates, below the 50% vote share threshold the propensity to
form a majoritarian government is an increasing function of the vote share earned by
21Analysing bandwidth 45%-55%, where statistical significance is lost, represents droping 17%, 29%,
67% and 79% of CM, MM, MC and CC transitions, respectively.
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the most voted party. We try to assess whether the additional “political capital” held
by majoritarian governments who received higher vote shares allows them to increase
investment more than municipalities who earned majority with lower vote shares – the
intensity of treatment. To do so, we interact the vote share of the most voted party with
the treatment of interest Mt and estimate the following equation, where the interaction
is added to equation 2:
Yit = β0 + β1Mit−4 + β2Mit + β3Mit ∗ V oteShareit + δ′X + γt + γNUTS3 + εit, (3)
Column (4) of Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation 3 on the sample
around the discontinuity threshold.
The result is statistically significant and large in magnitude. However, one needs to
note that the coefficient on Mt has become negative, and the total effect is given by β2 +
β3, which is positive.
22 The result points that a larger political capital earned at the polls
backs additional investment increases by more confortable majorities relative to weaker
majorities.
Finally, in our baseline equation β2 captures the effect of two different transitions – to
become a just majority from being a just coalition (CM) and to remain a just majority
as opposed to becoming a just coalition (MM). In order to test if any of the transitions
drives the effect (or both), we estimate equation 2 separately for municipalities that
were just majorities and those that were just coalitions in the previous electoral period.
Table 8 lays the results, which show a large significant effect of those becoming just
majorities and an insignificant effect on those remaining so, suggesting that the main
driver of the increase are those municipalities that change from being just coalitions to
being just majorities. Although the small number of MC transitions for comparison may
harm statistical significance of the MM coefficient and drive its insignificance, the point
estimate is still very low when compared to that of CM ′s.
7 Alternative: The Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
Following Garmann (2014), we explore an additional strategy to derive a causal effect and
given Figure 2, we explore a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) setting (or Regression
22The total effect β2 + β3 is positive for vote share values above 37%. The majority with lower vote
share has earned 39,9% of votes and the mean value is of 52%, confirming the total effect to be strictly
positive.
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Table 8: The Driver: CM or MM?




Notes: All regressions include year and NUTS 3 fixed effects as well as the full set of demographic, polit-
ical and socioeconomic controls. Standard Errors clustered at municipality level reported in parentheses
for the coefficient of interest. 90 clusters in (1) and 220 in (2) Observations above the 99th percentile of
the dependent variable were dropped. Significance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
Kink Design (RKD)).23
As Imbens and Lemieux (2008) emphasize, the estimator in a FRD setting is equivalent
to that of a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) procedure. The implementation proceeds by
using an indicator of whether the most voted party had more than 50% of the votes as an
instrument for the majority status and applying local linear regressions to observations
located around the discontinuity threshold. The first and second stage can be respectively
represented by equations 4 and 5 in the following manner:
Majit = α+ β1vshareit + β2vshareit ∗Aboveit + γt + εit, vshareit ∈ [0.5− b, 0.5 + b] (4)
Yit = λ0 + λ1M̂aj + τvshareit + γt + µit, vshareit ∈ [0.5− b, 0.5 + b] (5)
where Majit is an indicator equal to 1 if municipality i’s mayor rules under majority,
vshareit is the vote share it received in the previous election, Aboveit is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the most voted party received more that 50% of votes, and γt
represents year fixed-effects to control for aggregate shocks. The bandwidth around the
discontinuity to which the sample is restricted is denoted by b.
While the external validity is limited a priori, since the analysis is strictly local, the
internal validity of the FRD strategy depends on the assumption that municipalities on
both sides of threshold are similar in terms of baseline pre-treatment covariates except
for treatment probability. Balance tests are presented in the appendix for three different
bandwidths, 3%, 5% and 10%. Overall balance on pre-treatment covariates is attained
for bandwidths of 3% of the vote share, although such a restriction to our sample limits
our analysis, as only 27 coalitions and 300 majorities are considered. Other assumption
is that there should be no direct effect of the vote share on the outcome variable at the
50% threshold, which Figure 4 has previously confirmed.24
23Unlike in the sharp regression discontinuity, in the fuzzy regression discontinuity the probability of
treatment does not need to jump from 0 to 1 around the threshold, but we need only observe a positive
jump in the probability. In this setting, we observe a jump from a positive probability before the 50%
vote share threshold to 1 after it. Garmann (2014) refers to it as a “kink”.
24We choose not to center the assignment variable around the discontinuity threshold 0.5 as Gar-
mann(2014).
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Notes: Regression includes year
fixed effects. Robust standard errors
presented in paretheses. Significance
levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
Table 9 presents the results of the local linear regression expressed by 5. Employing
a FRD strategy to municipalities within the 3% vote share bandwidth, we find a positive
significant effect of majority governments, which confirms our results in Section 6. A
first-stage F-stat of 1.48 shows that we may be faced with a weak instrument problem.25
It is noteworthy that this evidence in favor of a causal impact of majorities is obtained
with quite a narrow bandwidth and, consequently, a small number of observations which
could a priori undermine the significance of the estimation.
8 Conclusions and Limitations
The objective of this study is to investigate whether absolute majorities spend less than
coalition governments, as predicted by theory. Applying a two-step methodology which
involves the exploration of discontinuities in government type – the ability to form a
majority government is determined by the ability of the winning party to earn the last
seat that guarantees majority in the Council (just majority) – and government type
variations around that discontinuity threshold, we are able to infer causality.
Focusing on portuguese municipalities’ investment between 1993 and 2012, we find
consistent evidence that, contrary to theoretical predictions, just majorities in the City
Hall Council increase their investment levels relative to just coalition governments. Results
are statistically significant and economically relevant, with average investment increases
of 8% to 13%, depending on the specification. The result is not driven by large cities
nor ideological orientation of incumbents, and the relationship between executive and
legislative power in municipalities does not seem make a difference.
Furthermore, the results are robust to vote share bandwidth reductions to confirm
25First Stage Regression shown in Appendix. Note that the coefficients are almost symmetric and
that the coefficient on vhareit is positive and the coeficient on vshareit ∗Aboveit is negative which is in
line with our predictions as, above the threshold, additional vote share does not significantly impact the
probability to become a majority as it already is 1. The sum of both coefficients is close to 0.
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close elections analysis. The effect is driven mostly by increases in municipalities that
become just majorities as municipalities remaining majorities do not significantly increase
their investment levels relative to those who become just coalitions over an election. The
investment increase by just majority governments is further enhanced by the vote share
earned in the previous election, suggesting that additional political capital intensifies the
effect. Preliminar evidence using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design further confirms
our results.
It is important to emphasize that our results are local and mean that it is the last
seat earnt that induces an invesment increase relative to the case where the winning party
is not able to earn that seat. Furthermore, we do not elaborate any statement on the
relative performance of majority and coalition governments. Our analysis focuses solely on
the expenditure side, and populations’ welfare also depends on the efficiency and quality
of public good provisison, the relationship between both measures and the expenditure
composition.
A major limitation to our study is the few government type transitions and the fact
that the local political landscape is vastly dominated by majoritarian governments through
the whole period. Although we are able to attain consistent statistical significance across
specifications, estimation method possibilities and choices are limited a priori by the
nature of our data. The existance of infinitesimally close elections (1% or 2% vote band-
widths) with enough variation in outcomes would be ideal but is not possible due to the
reduced number of seats into which votes are translated (5 to 17).
This work project opens scope for further research to investigate which components of
investment are more impacted by the effect (total investment is analysed) and calls for the
development of alternative theoretical mechanisms explaining the increase in investment
by absolute majorities. We lay some possibilities we consider plausible and worth investi-
gating: (1) Differences in the ability of majorities and coalitions to make use of political
business cycles to influence re-election possibilities (Veiga and Veiga, 2007a); (2) The
effect of holding majority on governments’ intentions to take advantage of incumbency
to overinvest in their preferred items; (3) The possibility of veto from coalition members
leading to mutual blocking of proposals and underimplementation of projects.
Investigating the possible existence of a non-monotonic effect throughout the vote
share distribution is a final suggestion. To understand how the different combinations
of political capital by different parties in a coalition relate to the different relations of
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Table 10: Vote Share Bandwidth - 47%-53%
Coalition Majority Difference
Total Population 45162.15 33485.95 11637.06
PopShare 65+ 0.209 0.209 -0.000
Nr of Seats in Council 4.09 3.54 0.55
Coastal 0.29 0.18 0.11
Observations 27 300
Notes: Baseline pre-treatment covariates measured in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006.
Significance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
Table 11: Vote Share Bandwidth - 45%-55%
Coalition Majority Difference
Total Population 55755.75 32034.63 23721.13***
PopShare 65+ 0.203 0.210 -0.01
Nr of Seats in Council 7.23 6.70 0.529**
Coastal 0.37 0.18 0.19***
Observations 53 463
Notes: Baseline pre-treatment covariates measured in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006. Sig-
nificance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
Table 12: Vote Share Bandwidth - 40%-60%
Coalition Majority Difference
Total Population 59173.82 34262.62 24909.20***
PopShare 65+ 0.194 0.208 0.015**
Nr of Seats in Council 7.42 6.72 0.70***
Coastal 0.37 0.20 0.17***
Observations 90 721
Notes: Baseline pre-treatment covariates measured in 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006. Sig-
nificance levels: 1%*** 5%** 10%*
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Table 13: Fuzzy Regression - First Stage
vshareit 3.75***
(0.90)




Notes: Regression includes year fixed-
effects. Robust Standard Errors presented
in parentheses Significance levels: 1%***
5%** 10%*
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